Submission to The Social Lens: A Social Work Action Blog by Marjorie Johnstone, Dalhousie University.
Child welfare practice is complex, multifaceted and at times, controversial, with social workers in the crosshairs of media coverage when cases are judged to have gone awry. Child protection workers are placed in roles of authority in line with legislative mandates which often locates them in the involuntary sector of social work practice. Some child protection investigations may result in family separation and protective custody; nevertheless, much of their work is less dramatic and involves engaging families in a process of protective change (Johnstone, 2020; Dumbrill, 2011).
As child protection work is performed by the social work profession on behalf of the state, legislative adherence is a priority. Child welfare agencies create detailed policies, guidelines and procedures in an attempt to standardize the practice and to ensure legal compliance and efficiency. Social work scholars have invested in developing risk assessment tools to make decision making evidence-based, scientific and efficient (Leshied, Chiodo, Whitehead & Marshall, 2003). However, this still leaves unaddressed the broader question of our professional mandate to centre social justice in our practice and invites the question as to how this can be done in a mandated field of practice. In this blog I will outline the limitations of over-reliance on a narrow risk assessment approach and show how the conceptual framework of epistemic justice can contribute to centering social justice in child welfare practice.
In 2017, CBC News reported, “It’s a tragedy: how the flawed motherisk hairtest helped fracture families across Canada.” Using strands of hair, the motherisk hairlab in Toronto ran tests which claimed to accurately measure the alcohol usage of the hair owner over the preceding month. This test was regularly used by child welfare agencies in five provinces of Canada to ascertain substance use and was pivotal evidence in many child apprehension cases (Mayor, 2017). Unfortunately this testing process was deeply flawed and it was the creative generation of counter evidence produced by a lawyer which exposed this. In response to the heartrending pleas of his client Tammy Whiteman, whose children had been apprehended, he used an alternative monitoring technology (round-the-clock camera surveillance) which produced results which were discrepant with the hairtest results. Further examination revealed that the hairtest was actually measuring the alcohol content in Tammy’s hairspray rather than her alcohol consumption. This dramatic finding resulted in the review of 3,500 child protection cases.
The learning which I consider important from this episode is that over-reliance on a single assessment tool is problematic. How we assess problems is linked with how we construct knowledge of our world and how we ascertain what we consider to be “true.” Traditional approaches to assessment have been influenced by positivist epistemology which seeks to understand objective reality and truth through scientific methods.
This approach informs evidence-based social work (Gibbs, 2003) and a strict risk assessment application (such as the motherisk test) is consistent with this epistemology. Assessment from a postmodern and critical perspective rests on an epistemology which understands the world as multifaceted and constructed with truth conceptualized as fluid and changing. Within this model, important principles of social justice can be mobilized (Fook, 2016).
Framing an assessment framework becomes broad in scope, encompassing the service user’s story, the perspectives of other stakeholders, and the context—including individual, family and community locations, as well as the political and structural factors which impinge on the situation. Risk assessment tools can be useful but should be employed as components of a far wider framework. By considering the social and political factors, social justice issues become visible and can be addressed.
A useful theoretical framework is provided through the work of critical philosopher Miranda Fricker (2007). She pursues the idea that there is an epistemic form of injustice which is a wrong done to another in their capacity as a knower. Fricker identifies that this denial of credibility is greater than simply not believing a person’s account, but instead is actually a denial of their humanity as the ability to conceptualise and communicate our lived experience is what makes us distinctively human. This denial of humanity is deeply hurtful. Fricker distinguishes two main types of epistemic injustice.
Firstly, there is testimonial injustice: when prejudice prevents a hearer from believing what a person is saying. This was evident in the case of Tammy Whiteman, where her reputation as an addict meant that her declaration that she was not using alcohol was discounted by the child protection workers who assessed her. She was told that she was in denial and should seek counselling.
The second form of epistemic injustice is hermeneutic injustice: where what is reported is not understood as there is no collective understanding of the phenomenon. A good example of this which Fricker uses to illustrate the concept is the phenomenon of sexual harassment. It was feminists in the 1970s who identified and named this after consciousness-raising groups pooled the collective experiences of women. As a result of naming this phenomenon, rules and regulations were established, and the workplace is now very different as a result. The phenomenon was not new but the naming was. However, until there is a collective recognition of the phenomenon, individual victims will experience hermeneutic injustice as their experience is not understood. In addition, they may have difficulty even understanding it themselves as there is a limited or even non-existent vocabulary to describe what is happening.
Applying principles of epistemic justice to child welfare assessment
Central to epistemic justice is active, accurate and empathic listening. Social work and psychotherapy scholars have long agreed on the fundamental importance of empathically listening to a client’s story (Berzoff, Flanagan & Herz, 2016; Norcross, 2011; White & Morgan, 2006). It is through the therapeutic alliance — the building of mutual respect and trust — that a therapeutic working relationship allows a collaborative foundation for engagement and work. Openness, warmth and empathy encourage participation. Active listening requires that you convey your understanding, and for this paraphrasing and summarizing are essential tools. It is not enough to say “I get it” or “I totally understand”; you must convey your accurate listening by repeating back a summary of what you have heard and checking that this is correct.
It is through this process that the client experiences being heard (testimonial justice) and equally as important if the client is actually trying to articulate experiences that are confusing or perhaps not well understood (a hermeneutic gap), then this can begin the labourious process of putting words to the experience. In this way you are fostering hermeneutic justice. Showing respect by treating the client as a good informant and communicating understanding and respect for the client’s knowledge and experience establishes a communication that is built on epistemic justice.
A critical clinical approach to social work acknowledges openly that there are power differentials and in child welfare practice this is particularly relevant. It is important to discuss legal and procedural requirements and to be transparent about social inequalities and power differences but at the same time to convey respect. Remembering the principles of epistemic justice provides the tools to do this and thus can centre social justice in our practice. Communicating respect does not mean that you must agree with everything you hear, nor does it mean that you must praise when you do not think what you are hearing is praiseworthy. You can listen to accounts of actions that were “against the better judgment” of a client and explore what the “better judgement” might be. Listening carefully and asking clarifying, probing questions communicates not only your interest but your wish to accurately understand.
Risk assessments in child protection cases are most often completed by the social worker and the voice of the child is often forgotten. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) was ratified in Canada in 1991. The four principles enshrined in this are (1) the child’s right to the best interests of the child, (2) the right to non-discrimination, (3) the right to life, survival and development, and finally (4) the right to be heard (Bernstein, 2016).
It is this last principle, in particular, that addresses a central pillar of epistemic justice and which is so often denied children. Social work scholar Michael White (2006) identified some of the normative and developmental notions about children which are embedded in Western discourses and contribute to this exclusion; for instance, the idea that caretaking, nurturing and supervising are exclusively adult roles. There is a common pathologizing language that describes children who are socialized into these roles and considered in need of protection (parentified child, arrested development, child robbed of childhood). White reports that in his experience with children, they are resilient and well able to articulate in a family conference the effects of neglectful or abusive behaviours and what they would like to be different. This is an example of the principles of epistemic justice applied to child welfare work.
Currently the overrepresentation of Indigenous children, newly arrived immigrant children and African-Canadian children in care is now under scrutiny (Kikulwe, 2016). In his study of Black and immigrant families, Kikulwe identified that in many new immigrant families, social support networks are weak or even absent, and children often act as language and cultural brokers for their families and assume “adult-like” family roles. Refugee children often have experienced “adult-like” responsibilities since a young age and child protection workers are then tasked with teaching families about “parenting in Canada.” This often involves teaching “Canadian” disciplinary techniques, as methods such as corporal punishment can be grounds for child removal. In these challenging conversations it is particularly important that we practice epistemic justice and convey respect by listening very carefully to the experience and viewpoint of our clients.
Child protection work is profoundly important work and has the potential to significantly contribute to family and community well being. Understanding that complexity, messiness and uncertainty are part of the territory of working in this field and recognising that this mandated work creates wide power differences is important. But it is also important to realise that confining practice to a narrow risk assessment process invites abuse of power and injustice. The motherisk test was used for fifteen years before a lawyer (not a social worker) questioned the disparity between what he heard from his client and the test results. By following the principles of epistemic justice and listening respectfully and deeply to our clients, we can provide a more socially just service.
References
Bernstein, M. (2016). Honoring the twenty-fifth anniversary of the united nations convention on the rights of the child: Transforming child welfare in Canada into a stronger rights-based system. In M. Montgomery, D. Badry, D. Fuchs & D. Kikulwe (Eds.), Transforming child welfare interdisciplinary practices, field education, and research voices from the prairies (pp. 3-27). Regina: University of Regina Press.
Berzoff, J., Flanagan, L.M. & Herz, P. (2016). Inside out and outside in: Psychodynamic clinical theory and psychopathology in contemporary multicultural contexts (4th ed). New York: Jason Aronson.
Dumbrill, G. (2011). Doing anti-oppressive child protection casework. In D. Baines (Ed). Doing anti-oppressive practice. social justice social work. 2nd edition (pp. 51-63). Canada: Fernwood Publishing.
Fook, J. (2016). Social Work. A Critical Approach to Practice. Sage.
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice power and ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gibbs, L. (2003). Evidence-based practice for the helping professions. A practical guide with integrated multimedia. United States: Thomson Brooks Cole.
Johnstone, M. (2020). Epistemic Injustice in Child Welfare Risk Assessment. In Brown, C. & MacDonald, J. (Eds.) Critical Clinical Social Work Practice: Counterstorying for Social Justice. Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press.
Kikulwe, D. (2016). Boundaries and identities: Racialized child welfare workers’ perspectives of their histories and perspectives when working with diverse families. In M. Montgomery, D. Badry, D. Fuchs & D. Kikulwe (Eds.), Transforming child welfare interdisciplinary practices, field education, and research voices from the prairies. Regina, University of Regina Press.
Leshied, A., Chiodo, P., Whitehead, D. & Marshall, L. (2003). The empirical basis of risk assessment in child welfare: The accuracy of risk assessment and clinical judgement. Child Welfare, 82(5), 527-540.
Milliken, E. (2012). Cultural safety and child welfare systems. In D. Fuchs, S. McKay & I. Brown, (Eds.). Awakening the spirit. moving forward in child welfare. Voices from the prairies. Regina: CPRC Press.
White, M. & Morgan, A. (2006). Narrative therapy with children and their families. Adelaide South Australia: Dulwich Centre Publications.
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